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THE THIRD WORLD AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: 
The Attitude of the Group of 77 
Toward the Continental Shelf 
In August of this year, representatives from 163 nations 
will, it is hoped, meet in Geneva for the resumed Ninth Session 
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS 111) to complete work on a comprehensive international 
convention on the law of the sea. All governments attending 
will have an opportunity to put their views on the record. 
Proposals which lead to consensus will be incorporated into a 
text that will be revised and prepared for a final meeting in 
Caracas, where the substantive work of the conference began in 
1 
1974. At the Caracas meeting, the "final act" including the 
results of the seven years of conference negotiations will be 
2 
signed and a new Law of the Sea Treaty will take effect after 
ratification by the requisite number of states as provided in 
the final clauses of the convention. 
No one knows with any certainty whether or not UNCLOS 111 
will end with the current Ninth Session. What is certain is that 
the Third World, acting as a unit through the Group of 77 
3 
(G-77), has made a significant impact on the treaty-making 
processes of the conference. In consequence, it is certain that 
37 
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some of the major provisions of the convention will reflect the 
articulated "position" of the Third World countries that the 
resources of the ocean space should be shared equitably, with 
preference being given to the needs of the developing countries. 
Several aspects of the work of the Group of 77 are 
addressed in this article. Part 1 will sketch the historical 
emergence of the Group of 77 and discuss how the group's unity 
has been sustained. Part 11 will focus on G-77 activities within 
the context of UNCLOS 111 and examine such concepts as "the 
common heritage of mankind" and the "New International Economic 
Order" as they have been treated in law of the sea discussions. 
Part 111 will discuss the Continental Shelf and the lack of a 
G-77 "position" on shelf matters. And Part IV will present 
suggestions for a compromise position the Continental Shelf. 
On the question of the author's methodology, it must be 
pointed out that many of UNCLOS 111 negotiating sessions are 
"informal" and, in consequence, there is little that approximates 
an official record of how decisions are reached within the Group 
of 77. In preparing this article, the author spoke on the record 
with members of the Jamaica delegation to UNCLOS 111, consulted 
with other UNCLOS 111 conferees, and used a variety of UN 
materials, e.g., provisional conference reports, and press 
releases. 
-PART 1: THE GROUP OF 77--IT5 RAISON D'ETRE 
From the beginning, unity of action was viewed as a sine 
qua non by the 77 nation states which came together in Geneva in 
38 
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1974 as the Group of 77 (G-77) and sought to challenge the 
Old Economic Order that had left the developing nations impover-
5 
ished, and to create a New International Economic Order that 
would give the world's poor nations the means to survive and 
flourish. Countless commentators have written about the complex 
legal, economic and political structures that have kept the 
developing nations, with 70 per cent of the world's population, 
poor, and have increased the fortunes of the rich nations. A 
few of these considerations may be outlined as follows: 1) There 
is a tremendous imbalance in the distribution of the world's 
money reserves; the poor nations receive less than four per cent 
of international money reserves, while the rich nations, through 
the expansion of their national reserve currencies and their 
control over the International Monetary Fund, control money 
reserves globally. 2) Contracts, leases, terms of trade and 
concessions negotiated in the past between multinational corpo-
rations and developing countries reflect an inequitable sharing 
of benefits. In many cases, the host country receives a mere 
fraction of the benefits from exploitation of its own resources 
by the multinational corporations. 3) Poor nations have only a 
pro forma participation in the economic decision-making in the 
world. Their advice is seldom solicited when the decisions on 
the future of the world economy are being made; further, their 
numerical majority in the United Nations General Assembly has 
6 
only marginally affected international economic decisions. 
It is against this background that an analysis of the role 
39 
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of G-77 must be made. Except for Yugoslavia, (one of the original 
G-77 members) Malta and Rumania, all the members of the group 
7 
are from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Factors which tend to 
link Group members and indeed all the nations of the Third World 
include: 1) a history of poverty; 2) a history of colonialism; 
3) illiteracy; 4) a history of racial discrimination linked to 
8 
the colonial past and 5) a history of dependency. Accession to 
independent nationhood left many Third World nations with all 
the features of a colonial past intact and with very few of the 
means by which a nation brings meaning to the concept of nation-
hood. Moreover, prior to their gaining independence, there had 
'been no real attempt for these nations to get together to discuss 
common problems, and common goals. It was clear to the new 
nations that corrective action was needed and it was equally 
9 
clear that the United Nations, which the new nations now dominated 
numerically, would become the most powerful forum for exerting 
pressure and achieving the goal of a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO). Thus, the Group made a major declaration at the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Con-
ference in Geneva: The Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven 
10 
Developing Countries. The Group's unity was described as 
follows: 
. The unity ... has sprung out of the fact that facing 
the basic problems of development they have a common 
interest in a new policy for international trade and 
development ... The developing countries have a strong 
conviction that there is a vital need to maintain, and 
further strengthen this unity in the years ahead ... 
It is an indispensable instrument for securing the 
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adoption of new attitudes and new approaches in the 
international economic field.11 
Regional meetings were held; these were followed by sub-regional 
meetings among heads of governments. For purposes of organiza-
tional convenience, the Group was divided into a Latin American 
group, the African group and the Asian group. The insistent 
theme was cooperation as a means of securing collective self-
12 
reliance for the new nations. The resolution of the Sixth 
Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 
was a statement of advocacy, favoring the establishment of the 
13 
4/ 
NIEO. Nation states, the resolution said, had "full sovereignty" 
over their national resources, and all economic a'cti vi ties, 
including the right to nationalize or transfer ownership to its 
14 
nationals. Thus, at G-77 conferences from Nairobi to Mexico, 
the same theme was noted repeatedly: "self determination of the 
developing countries to develop their economies in accordance 
with their own needs and problems and on the basis of their 
15 
national aspirations and experiences." Inevitably, the aims 
of the Group of 77 as outlined in its call for the new economic 
order, were viewed as a potential threat to the developed nations 
of the world. The law of the negotiations offered an auspicious 
setting for observing how this threatened dichotomy resolved 
itself. 
PART 11: G-77 AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 
A discussion of how the Law of the Sea Conference is 
organized would, perhaps, be a suitable starting point for 
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analysis. The conference, the first session of which was con-
16 
vened in New York in December 1973, was organized to attempt to 
prepare a single, comprehensive convention to guide nation 
states in the uses of the seas. For centuries, ever since the 
days of ancient Greece and Rome, the accepted international 
17 
regime governing the ocean space was "freedom of the seas". 
In other words, the seas beyond a very narrow area of national 
jurisdiction were open for use by all nations for navigation, 
18 
trade, fishing, exploration and research. Another freedom, to 
construct artificial islands and platforms, has been recognized 
in recent years. But there were those nation states that favored 
closed seas to which they would have exclusive jurisdiction. In 
time it came to be generally accepted that a nation could claim 
control over certain of its coastal waters and a belt of the 
territorial sea. It was not long before nation states began to 
make claims for exclusive control of areas of the seabed and the 
19 
mineral and energy resources that the seabed contains. 
42 
In 1945, President Truman, in two proclamations, made certain 
claims to jurisdiction over continental shelf resources and over 
20 
coastal fisheries. The Truman proclamations granted to each 
coastal state "the exclusive right to explore and exploit the 
resources of the seabed and the subsoil of the adjacent continental 
21 
shelf beyond the territorial sea. " Inevitably, the Truman 
proclamation on behalf of the United States was followed by 
22 
similar proclamations by the leaders of other nation states. 
Accordingly, the International Law Commission in 1949 began the 
j 
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necessary process of attempting to draft articles for a regime 
23 
that would guide nations in their use of the high seas. The 
Commission's drafts were used as a basis for the first United 
43 
24 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in Geneva in 1958. 
Four conventions were adopted at that conference: they related to 
the territorial sea; the high seas; fishing and conservation of 
25 
living marine resources; and the continental shelf. 
At the time the first conference on the law of the sea was 
26 
convened, there were 86 nation states participating. The present 
Third conference was convened in 1973 
(H)aving regard to the fact that many of the present 
states, members of the U.N. did not take part in 
previous UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea ... 
(The U.N.) decided to convene ... a conference on 
the Law of the Sea which would deal with an equitable 
international regime ... 27 
By this declaration, the United Nations recognized that for a 
law of the sea convention to be equitable and binding, new, 
mostly Third World nations which had only recently been admitted 
to UN membership, would have to participate in its drafting. 
In structure, the conference is modeled after its predecessor, 
28 
The United Nations Seabed Committee. Three committees, each 
with large portfolios, handle the business of the conference. 
The First Committee deals with the international regime and 
machinery for the seabed beyond the limits of national juris-
diction. The Second Committee deals with the territorial seas; 
straits; the economic zone; access to the sea; and the conti-
nental shelf. The Third Committee treats such subjects as 
pollution and marine technology. In addition, there are seven 
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negotiating groups, each of which is charged with the duty of 
discussing "hard core" issues. The groups and their specialties 
are: 
Negotiating Group 1 ---the system of exploration and 
exploitation of the international seabed area; 
Negotiating Group 2 ---the financial arrangements for 
seabed mining; 
Negotiating Group 3 ---the organs of the proposed Inter-
national Seabed Authority; 
Negotiating Group 4 ---the right of access of landlocked 
states to the living resources of the seas; 
shelf; 
Negotiating Group 5 ---dispute settlement; 
Negotiating Group 6 ---definition of the continental 
Negotiating Group 7 ---delimitation of the maritime 
29 
boundaries between geographically adjacent and opposite states. 
Finally, there are several working groups---the Working 
Group of 21 on First Committee Matters; the Group of 38 which 
deals with the continental shelf; the Group of Legal Experts on 
the Settlement of Disputes relating to the international seabed 
area; the Group of Legal Experts on Final C1auses--and three 
Committees--a general committee made up of countries whose 
representatives are office holders in one of the main committees; 
30 
a drafting committee and a credentials committee. 
Examination of Third World participation in the leadership 
of the conference committees and groups reveals the following: 
44 
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the president of the plenary or main committee of the conference 
is a Third World (TW) representative; so too are the chairmen of 
the First and Second Committees. Negotiating Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 6 are chaired by TW representatives. The Working Group of 
21, the Group of 38 and the General Committee also are chaired 
31 
by TW representatives. 
These leadership positions have, in practice, provided G-77 
with vital contact points for discussion and negotiation both 
within the context of the Group and within the larger context of 
the Conference. As the leader of the Jamaica delegation noted: 
"After.such meetings in which a matter is distilled within the 
45 
various groups (of G-77), the G-77 takes a position which promotes 
the interest of the developing countries. Each G-77 country 
knows the importance of having mass support, so no one runs the 
32 
risk of alienating the others." But while the assertion of 
G-77 positions takes place by way of a process of trade-offs 
within the Group's plenary, it is the ability of the Group to 
make these positions take hold within the conference as a whole 
that really counts. Moreover, procedural rules adopted by the 
conference at large, require the affirmation of a Gentleman's 
33 
Agreement which provides that the "Conference should make every 
effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of 
consensus and there should be no voting on such matters until 
34 
all efforts at consensus have been exhausted." Thus, the test 
of the effectiveness of G-77 within UNCLOS 111 is the extent 
to which the Group has been able to make acceptable to the 
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conference as a whole its position on two fundamental concepts: 
the "Common Heritage of Mankind" and the New International Economic 
Order. 
The Common Heritage Principle 
In a universally praised speech before the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1967, Maltese Ambassador Arvid Prado told the 
world of the vast resource potential that lay beneath the oceans 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and warned that its 
existence created a "basic political problem" that could no longer 
35 
be avoided. The problem was the recognition that those resources 
constituted a common heritage of mankind in which all States 
were entitled to share. Particularly to be avoided, in Prado's 
view, was the possibility that technological capacity would 
determine which countries acquired the sea's wealth. Under such 
a formulation, it was said, the rich nations would get richer 
36 
and the poor nations would become relatively poorer. Prado 
proposed the establishment of an international regime: "Our long 
term objective is the creation of a special agency with adequate 
powers to administer, in the interests of mankind, the oceans 
37 
and the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction." 
38 
The United Nations set up an Ad Hoc Committee to study 
the question and later, a Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
39 
Jurisdiction. (The Sea-Bed Committee) was established. The 
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committee's duty was to study the various functions and powers 
of an international machinery that would be able to regulate, 
coordinate, supervise and control "all activities relating to 
the exploration and exploitation of the seabed resources for the 
40 
benefit of mankind as a whole." 
The developed nations greeted Prado's speech with skep-
41 
ticism, much of which still remains despite the passage of time, 
and with the adoption, by way of solemn declarations, of the 
42 
common heritage principle in (a) The Declaration of Principles 
Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof 
43 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction; (b) Article 136 of 
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Rev. 1 (ICNT), of UNCLOS 
44 45 
111; and (c) the Moratorium Resolution. At the time of Prado's 
speech, the cautionary stance of the developed nations was re-
flected by the Soviet view: "Regarding the preparation of inter-
national legal principles, we should particularly like to stress 
46 
the inadmissibility of any undue haste." France sought to 
maintain the principle of freedom of the seas; and the United 
States proposed a "committee on the deep ocean" but wanted the 
47 
seas to remain open to all States "without discrimination." 
47 
In summary form, the common heritage principle incorporates 
these ideas: (1) the seabed area (referred to generally as the 
Area) shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by 
states or persons, natural or juridical; (2) the area shall be 
reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes; and (3) the exploration 
of the area and the exploitation of its resources shall be carried 
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48 
out for the benefit of mankind as a whole. What the principle 
implies, then, is that the common heritage cannot be appropriated; 
it is res communis, and belongs to everyone. The principle 
also implies that among the benefits to be shared are the tech-
49 
nologies to be used to exploit and explore the common heritage. 
The developed co~ntries, and in particular the multinational 
corporations in these countries, believe the common heritage 
principle acts as a barrier to the exploration and exploitation 
50 
of the seabed area. The developing countries, on the other hand, 
view the principle as a principal means for the attainment of 
51 
a New International Economic Order. Accordingly" the Group of 77, 
following Prado's lead, have called for the establishment of an 
International Seabed Authority with the power to 1) regulate and 
control exploration and exploitation of the seabed; 2) limit 
production and set prices; and 3) contract and manage the exploita-
tion of the resources. The operating arm of the Seabed Authority 
that would carry out this function in the wider context of the 
law of the sea, is the Enterprise. The Enterprise would cooperate 
52 
with other entities which already have seabed mining technology. 
The developed countries have tended to doubt whether the Enterprise 
would exercise the business judgment necessary to enable it to 
53 
carry out its mandate as set out in Article 170 of the ICNT. 
While agreeing with the need for the seabed authority, the developed 
nations would like to ensure that developing countries do not use 
the power of the Authority and its several organs--the Council and 
54 
the Assembly--against the interests of the developed nations. 
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At present, there are four United States companies, members 
of international consortia, with the proven capability of mining 
55 
the wealth of the oceans. It is estimated that the cost of each 
fullscale mining operation, including recovery, transportation 
and processing, may vary from $300 to $600 million. In a funda-
mental sense, the dev.eloped nations see themselves as being 
under pressure from private industry to gain access to the seabed 
56 
resources and to do so now. 
In the United States Congress, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral 
Resources Bill was passed by the House of Representatives and 
57 
introduced into the 96th Congress. Its passage w~uld empower 
United States citizens to mine hard minerals, during the interim 
period, "pending the entering into force with respect to the 
United States" of an international regime, i.e. a Law of the Sea 
58 
Convention. 
In response to this development, and in response to the 
promise of similar trends within the developed world, the Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Group of 77 passed 
a resolution declaring that "any unilateral measures, legislation, 
or agreement restricted to a limited number of States on seabed 
mining, are unlawful and violate well-established and imperative 
59 
rules of international law." The reason for impatience in the 
developed nations was stated by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations: 
. . . do the developing nations understand that 
by entering into the (Law of the Sea) negotiations, 
and remaining faithful with them, the United States 
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and the western nations generally have agreed to 
negotiate for, and in the bargaining sense, to pay 
for rights which exist in the absence of a 
treaty? ... We did not have to do this. We have 
under existing international law . . . the perfect 
right to extract mineral resources from the deep 
ocean beyond the Continental Shelf. Moreover, we 
have the technology to do so. 60 
PART 111: THE CONCEPT OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Introduction 
The object of the tense debate between the developed and 
developing nations in the UNCLOS 111 context is, of course, 
access to resources--manganese, copper, cobalt, nickel, zinc, 
61 
chromium, and especially oil. The developed world needs these 
resources to fuel their economies, and the Third World nations 
need these resources to pay their oil debts and to get their 
beaten economies going. The non-oil producing Third World 
countries especially, depend as a group on balance-of-payments 
support from the private banking system; credits from commercial 
banks to these countries doubled from $10 billion to about $23 
62 
billion in two years. And there are signs that the non-oil 
50 
producing Third World economies are threatening to collapse under 
63 
the strain of debt. A central factor in the New International 
Order equation is the Continental Shelf and the resources that lay 
beneath it. These resources, G-77 countries hope, will mean 
economic recovery. 
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The Continental Shelf: A Definition 
The continental shelf has been described as 
(t)he seaward portion of the extension of the conti-
nental land mass which begins with the upland coastal 
plain and extends seaward until a marked increase in 
slope occurs. Although the continental shelf actually 
consists of the entire continental structure beginning 
at approximately the 600-foot contour above sea level, 
only the submerged portion is of interest to those 
concerned with marine resources, and the term has come 
generally to refer only to that submerged portion. 64 
As a consequence of massive movements of landmass more than two 
hundred million years ago, an area, known as a continental margin 
65 
has been created around each continent below sea level. This 
margin contains three major elements: the continental shelf, 
the continental slope and the continental rise. In global terms, 
the shelf and slope represent about 15 per cent of the total 
seabed area, with the rise representing about five per cent. 
Within the margin, it is believed that about 98 per cent of the 
petroleum resources of the seabed lie; about 75 per cent of those 
resources are believed to lie under the continental shelf and the 
66 
continental slope. As noted before, the Truman Proclamation 
stated that the United States had jurisdiction over its continental 
shelf and was therefore free to pursue mineral exploitation of the 
shelf since the shelf was "an extension of the land mass of the 
67 
coastal nation and thus naturally appuertenant to it ... " 
But it was not the recognition of the continental shelf as a 
geographical or geological phenomenon that riveted interest on the 
potential of the shelf; the focus of the world attention has been 
Boston College THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 52 
on the continental shelf as a legal entity, the shelf defined in 
a way that would clearly recite the specific boundary limitations 
68 
and the specific legal rights of states within those boundaries. 
The clearest attempt at a legal definition is contained in the 1958 
69 
U.N. Convention on the Continental Shelf. By its terms, the con-
vention in Article 1 states that the term continental shelf refers 
to 
(a) . . . the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area 
of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, 
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the super-
jacent waters admits of the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the 
seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent 
to the coasts of islands. 70 
Article 2 provides the coastal states with sovereign rights over 
the continental shelf; the states can explore and exploit the 
natural resources therein, i.e., "the mineral and other non-living 
71 
organisms belonging to sedentary species." 
The 1958 U.N. Convention on the Continental Shelf has be~n 
criticized as inadequate and therefore unsatisfactory, by both 
72 
G-77 and developed countries. In general the criticism turns on 
the Convention's failure to state what the outer limits of the 
shelf really are. An approximate G-77 view of the convention is 
that 
... it defines the shelf in terms of a 200-metre 
depth or beyond that depth to where the super-
jacent waters admit of exploitability. Now the 
200-metre test is a firm and definitive test, but 
the exploitability test is open-ended and operates 
to the disadvantage principally of the developing 
countries, because the exploitability test means 
that if you have the potential, the know-how to 
exploit then you have the potential to claim vast 
expanses of seabed.73 
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Another study of the "exploitability" criterion suggests that if 
the sole barrier to national jurisdiction expansion is that of 
"exploitability", then the Convention "may inadvertently have 
53 
sanctioned exclusive national jurisdiction over natural resources 
beyond the flat shelf, past the slope and rise into the very 
74 
deep seabed itself." The study further suggests that by virtue 
of the exploitability criterion, the whole seabed of the world 
"has been inchoately apportioned among coastal states, to the 
75 
median line between the continents." It also has been pointed 
out that although the Convention states that the shelf refers to 
"where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of ... 
exploitation", there may be difficulties in the exploitation of 
the area stemming from causes not related simply to depth, i.e., 
even where depth is not an obstacle, exploitation may be 
76 
impossible. 
The question of limits was considered by the International 
77 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Case. A dispute arose 
between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and 
Denmark and the Netherlands on the other, concerning a definition 
of the boundaries separating the adjacent states. What the North 
Sea Case contributed to the developing doctrine on the continental 
shelf was a clearer legal definition of the shelf. The ICJ said 
that ~ definition of the shelf should be based on the relationship 
between the mainland of the state and the resources of the sub-
merged areas which can be regarded as the natural prolongation of 
the mainland: "The rights of the coastal state in respect of 
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the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolonga~ 
tion of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto 
and ab initio by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, as an 
78 
extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights'l for exploration 
and exploitation of the natural resources. The right, the court 
.79 
stated, is an "inherent" right. What this means is that until 
some new international rule is promulgated, the coastal states 
have exclusive jurisdiction over the exploitation of the non-living 
resources within their continental margins. 
Article 76 of the ICNT/Rev. 1, attempts a different defini~ 
80 
tion of the Continental Shelf. It is said to combine a geomor-
phological definition of the shelf--related to the foot of the 
continental slope--with a limiting clause based on distance or a 
combination of distance and depth. Thus the attempt is to combine 
the positions of countries which stress the character of the 
shelf as a natural prolongation of the state's land territory, 
with the attitude of other states that feel there must be a limit 
to the extent of national jurisdiction of states with broad 
81 
shelv~s. 
Article 76 provides that information on the limits of the 
continental shelf when it extends beyond the ZOO-mile exclusive 
economic zone, could be submitted by the coastal state to a 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, established on 
82 
the basis of equitable geographic representation. The commission 
could make recommendations to coastal States on matters related 
to the establishment of the outer limits of the shelf; the limits 
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established by the coastal States, taking into account those 
83 
55 
recommendations, "shall be final and binding." Article 77 of the 
rCNT is the same as Article 2 of the 1958 U.N. shelf convention, 
while Article 78, new to the text, provides that the coastal state's 
exercise of its rights over the shelf, "must not infringe, or 
result in any unjustifiable interference with, navigation and 
84 
other rights and freedoms of other States." 
Changes that have occurred or that have been proposed with 
respect to the continental shelf may be summarized thus: 1) The 
exploitability test is no longer a valid way of determining how 
the shelf is defined; technology has advanced rapidly since the 
convention came into force, thus the ability to exploit is no 
85 
longer a valid or acceptable measure. 2) The North Sea case and 
other cases tried by the rCJ have established the nature of the 
jurisdiction which states have over their shelf areas--sovereign 
86 
rights for the purpose of exploitation and exploration. 3) The 
right of the coastal.state "to construct and maintain or operate 
on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary 
87 
for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural resources", 
does not include a right by the coastal state to construct 
installations for defense purposes. (Arguably, a state is not 
prohibited from constructing such installations, since the con-
vention does not make any explicit statements about such installa-
tions, but it would appear that the "common heritage principle", 
if it could be made to extend in a limited way to the continental 
shelf area within a state's jurisdiction, would certainly erect a 
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88 
barrier against a state's creating such installations.) 4) The 
definition of the shelf in the rCNT, states that the shelf comprises 
the sea-bed ... and areas that extend "beyond its territorial 
sea . . . or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
89 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured ... " 
This criterion, a distance-bounded criterion, as one authority 
notes, "has nothing to do with the traditional and geophysical 
concept of the continental shelf," but is, instead, a reflection 
of "the fact that the coastal state would in any event be entitled 
to exercise sovereign rights over the bed and subsoil of its 200 
90 
miles exclusive economic zone." 
But what of the continental shelf area that extends beyond 
200 miles? Does a nation limit its jurisdiction to 200 miles of 
its own prolongation and yield the distance of its shelf beyond 
200 miles for the use of other nations? These are some of the 
unsettled questions for Negotiating Group 6 as it enters the final 
91 
phases of UNCLOS Ill. The problem is especially momentous for the 
landlocked and geographically disadvantaged countries which have 
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no shelf or have very little shelf area. 
G-77 and the Continental Shelf 
As has been discussed above, G-77 states have viewed unity 
of action as a firm principle and in a variety of fora, they have 
held to that principle. With respect to the continental shelf, 
however, interests among G-77 states have tended to diverge and the 
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question has been whether a compromise is practicable or reach-
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able. 
With respect to the matters addressed by The First 
94 
Committee, G-77 states have been in general unified. G-77 
countries wish to see established a strong International Seabed 
Authority, with centralized power to regulate the exploration 
and exploitation of the common heritage area. G-77 countries 
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want to ensure that if the mining of the seabed becomes economically 
viable, revenues accrued from such mining is distributed by the 
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Authority, under a formula that favors developing countries. 
With respect to the continental shelf, there has been no 
G-77 position, however. The issue is critical since for G-77, 
the continental shelf figures as a central factor in the New 
International Economic Order equation. Discussions with Dr. 
96 
Kenneth Rattray, Rapporteur General of the Ninth Session of the 
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Conference, and Mr. Patrick Robinson, a member, with Dr. Rattray, 
of the Jamaican delegation to UNCLOS 111, reveal the following: 
1. The amount of shelf area a state claims is determined 
by how much shelf area the state has. Hence, a country with a wide 
expanse of ocean, such as Chile, Argentina, Canada and New Zealand, 
would be interested in a 200-mile economic zone, while a country 
that is landlocked or geographically disadvantaged, would have no 
such interest since very little would be gained from such a zone. 
The countries with a broad coastline would be in favor of an 
extended shelf area; the countries with no coastline would be for 
a restricted shelf area. There are G-77 countries in both 
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categories. 
2. The G-77 states that are either landlocked or 
geographically disadvantaged take the position that if a state 
already has 200 miles of seabed, it does not need to have 
jurisdiction over any wider seabed area and the continental shelf 
area would be subsumed within the 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone, at the 200-mile point. 
3. The G-77 states referred to as landlocked and 
geographically disadvantaged take the view that a cutoff point--
200 miles--should be declared and the matter should end there; 
such an approach places a premium on certainty: all nations 
would know precisely where national jurisdiction begins and where 
it ends and, ipso facto, where international jurisdiction takes 
over. 
PART IV: THE MOVEMENT TOWARD COMPROMISE ON THE 
CONTINENTAL SHELF ISSUE 
If the continental shelf is defined as a geographical entity, 
then it must be viewed as an entity which has a starting point and 
an end point related not to a legal concept but to a concept rooted 
in physical geography and geology. On those terms, a 200-mile 
cutoff may be viewed as arbitrary and even unfair. The opposite 
view is that there is virtue in establishing a cutoff point: it is 
certain and simple; one knows where to start and one knows where 
to stop. 
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Ireland in 1978 suggested a "compromise" formula: 
"For the purpose of this Convention, the coastal 
State shall establish the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin wherever the margin extends be-
yond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured, by either: 
(a) A line delineated . . . by reference to the 
outermost fixed points at which the thickness 
of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of 
the shortest distance from such point to the 
foot of the continental slope; or 
(b) A line delineated . . . by reference to 
fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from 
the foot of the continental slope.98 
99 
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G-77 members interviewed by this author believe that a compromise 
will have to be along these lines: 
It will be a consensus that will accord to the 
coastal state jurisdiction over the shelf within 
a certain defined area beyond 200 miles, but in 
which area the coastal state will be obliged to 
contribute a part of its earnings from the 
exploitation of minerals of that area to the 
international communitY.100 
Interviewed several months later at the start of the Ninth Session 
of the Conference, the interviewees said: 
What will emerge as the most-favored position among the 
Group of 77 countries is something approximating 
the Soviet proposal which would extend the continental 
shelf beyond 200 miles to an ultimate cutoff point of 
probably another 100 miles, making it 300 miles in all. 
Among the broad shelf countries that proposal has 
gained wide support.101 
Where the coastal state explores and exploits beyond the cutoff 
point, it has to funnel funds earned through that exploitation 
through the International Seabed Authority, which would then 
102 
distribute the funds in accordance with a revenue sharing formula. 
Article 82 of the rCNT, concerning payments and contributions 
with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 
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200 miles, states conditions under which the revenues thus 
103 
earned would be shared. 
Item 2 of the Article states: 
The payments and contributions shall be made 
annually with respect to all production at a 
site after the first five years of production 
at the site. For the sixth year, the rate of 
payment or contribution shall be one per cent 
of the value or volume of production at the 
site . . 104 
Item 3 favors developing countries: 
A developing country which is a net importer of 
a mineral resource produced from its continental 
shelf is exempt from making such payments or con-
tributions in respect of that mineral resource.10S 
The aim of Article 82 is to ensure that revenues earned benefit 
all nations, "particularly the least developed and landlocked 
106 
among them." Under such a principle, G-77 countries such as 
Argentina, India, and Chile as well as developed countries such 
60 
as Canada, the United States and New Zealand, would make payments 
to such poor landlocked countries as Nepal, Afghanistan and 
Botswana, and also to such developed landlocked countries as 
Switzerland and Austria. The interests of G-77 members and the 
interests of the developed countries criss-cross at several 
points; under this principle of revenue sharing, geography is of 
much greater importance than legal, political and economic ideology. 
The continental shelf is where the oil is, but legal, political, 
and economic determinations are not enough to alter facts of 
geography and massive earth movements over time; hence the need 
foy compromise contained in the revenue sharing plan. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to examine several aspects of 
the work of the Group of 77 in the context of UNCLOS Ill. The 
Group, the article has stated, views unity as a guiding principle, 
and has used that unity to press a clearly articulated need for a 
New International Economic Order on the consciences of the entire 
world as, as importantly, to ensure that the need is outlined and 
put into operational terms in such documents as the ICNT. The 
article also has shown where the Third World G-77 influence has 
been clearly felt in UNCLOS Ill; many of the important committees 
at the conference were headed by G-77 representatives. The 
article has urged that the G-77 unity has remained intact, and 
that when, as in the case of the discussion on a G-77 attitude on 
the continental shelf, there has been evidence of a "breakdown" 
in that unity, G-77 membership has attempted to find a "compromise" 
agreement. 
The extent to which G-77 has made a difference in the 
UNCLOS III deliberations will be shown when the final draft of 
the convention is signed later this year. Perhaps because the 
law of the sea is changing rapidly and fundamentally, it can 
be expected that the convention will be a dynamic entity: that 
it will be subject to change and reinterpretation as new 
107 
circumstances arise. It seems fairly certain that as these changes 
occur, G-77, as a group, will continue to meet the challenge of 
change and to continue to work vigorously on behalf of the 
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developing nations of the world. 
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NOTES 
The organizational meeting of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 111) was held 
at UN Headquarters in New York December 3-15, 1973, and 
the first substantive session was held in Caracas June 
20 to August 29, 1974. Stevenson and Oxman, The Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 
1974 Caracas Session, 69 ADIL 1 (1975) at 1 (Hereinafter 
cited as Stevenson and Oxman.) 
The Conference hopes to complete the international con-
vention on the law of the sea by the end of the second 
session of a two-part Ninth Session; the first part of 
the Ninth Session ended Friday, April 11, 1980. 
See UN SEA/376 (27 February 1980) at 1 
The term, Group of 77 (G-77) describes the original 
77 Third World and developing countries which got 
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together in an effort to foster their own interests 
through a variety of fora. The name G-77 has been 
retained although the Group now includes 119 countries 
including Yugoslavia, Malta and Rumania. See A.O. Adede, 
The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International 
Sea-Bed Authority, 7 Ocean Development and Int. Law J. 
(The Jou. of Marine Affairs) 31 (1979). 
The term Third World is, for many commentators, a 
contentious term. See, e.g. P. Jalee, The Pillage 
of the Third World (1965), at 2, where he says in 
part: "Some readers may be surprised to find me using, 
even in the title, the expression "Third World" of 
which I have been severely critical. This expression 
• implies that the countries covered by it depend 
neither on the capitalist nor socialist system, that 
they belong to neither of the other two "worlds", which 
is obviously wrong. "An attempt at a definition 
appears in this Journal: See Greene, Toward A Definition 
of The Third World. 
Interviews were conducted with two members of the 
Jamaica delegation to UNCLOS 111. Mr. Patrick L. 
Robinson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, a senior 
member of the delegation, and a representative on the 
UN Sixth Committee, a body of legal representatives 
of member states, was interviewed twice: once in New 
York City (December, 1979) and once by phone (March 
1980). Also interviewed (and on the record) was Dr. 
Kenneth Rattray, leader of the Jamaica Delegation, and 
Rapporteur General at the Ninth Session of the 
Conference. He was interviewed by phone in March, 1980. 
Informal discussions were held with other delegates and 
a former UNCLOS representative, Elijah Legwaila, now 
an LLM student at Harvard Law School. It is worthy to 
note that the Jamaican delegates have been very active 
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in discussions in UNCLOS 111. See, for example, Adede, 
The System for Exploitation of the "Common Heritage of 
Mankind" at the Caracas Conf erence, 69 AJIL 31, 38 (1975). 
5. See, e.g., W.A. Lewis, The Evolution of the International 
Economic Order (1977); J. Galtung, Toward Self-Reliance 
and Global Interdependence; Joint Project in Environment 
and Development 3, (1978); M. ul Haq, Reactivating The 
North-South Dialogue (1978) 
6.. M. ul Haq, Reactivating the North-South Dialogue, 1-3 
(1978) . 
7.. See generally, A.O. Adede, The Group of 77 and The 
Establishment of the International Sea-Bed Authority, 
7 Ocean Development and International Law (The Journal 
of Marine Affairs) 31 (1979). 
8. See Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United 
Nations: An Emergent Group in the Law of the Sea, 16 
San Diego L.R. 555, 557 (1979). (Hereina~ter cited as 
Friedman); See generally, P. Worsley, The Third World 
(1977); See also, Beloff, The Third World and the 
Conflict of Ideologies, in THE THIRD WORLD: PREMISES OF 
U.S. POLICY (W. Scott Thompson ed. 1978). 
9. See P. Worsley, The Third World, 255-256 (1977), wherein 
is quoted the words of Haile Selassie, former president 
of Ethiopia, who expressed the faith of the developing 
nations in the United Nations, thus: "For us, the small, 
the weak, the under-developed, there is nowhere else to 
go. If we turn to one or the other of the major power 
groups, we risk engorgement, that gradual process of 
assimilation which destroys identity and personality. We 
must, from force of circumstances, look to the United 
Nations, however imperfect, however deficient. " 
10. See Friedman, note 8 supra, at 558-559. 
1.1. Id., at 559. 
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September, 1976. (Hereinafter cited as Report). 
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Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
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